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IN SEARCH OF JAMES’S MIDDLE PATH
James A. Montmarquet
William James indicated a “middle path” according to which religious ex-
perience yields something like knowledge for the mystic, but not a kind 
that others, who do not share his experience, are compelled to accept. Such 
a middle way is initially appealing, but how is it to be developed? Here I 
suggest three leading ideas—the epistemic analogue of “agent-relative per-
missions,” the complementary relationship between the Jamesian virtues of 
bold exploration and sober caution, and the kind of special access the lover 
may claim with respect to knowledge of his beloved—with an eye to such 
development. Each is found helpful, but in ascending order of importance.
I. Introduction
Part of the philosopher’s fate, it seems, is to be forever threading one’s way 
through some “twin peril,” and the present situation in the epistemology 
of religious experience could easily serve as a case in point. On one side 
there is the rocky shore of naturalism, safe and secure, but hardly fer-
tile ground for those seeking higher knowledge. Out beyond the crashing 
surf beckons an alluring creature, inviting those who seek such higher 
knowledge to come to her, suggesting that God may be “perceived.” She 
is alluring because perception would be knowledge; but in the end, one 
senses, she will disappoint.
It is of some comfort, then, to remind ourselves that a great figure in 
the history of this subject has marked out, if incompletely, a “middle path” 
for us. In The Varieties of Religious Experience,1 James does this mainly by 
drawing a sharp distinction between the mystic’s own experience and 
such claims as it may support (for the mystic herself), and the situation 
of those who do not share this experience. We take notice of each in turn.
Regarding the mystic’s experiences, James writes:
As a matter of psychological fact mystical considerations of a well-pro-
nounced and emphatic sort usually are authoritative over those who have 
them. They have been ‘there,’ and know. It is vain for rationalism to grum-
ble about this. . . . Our senses . . . have assured us of certain states of fact; 
but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions of fact for those who have 
them as any sensations ever were for us.2
1William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004). 
2Ibid., 366–367.
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But then there is the third person perspective of one who is not hav-
ing (and has no particular expectation of any time soon having) any such 
experiences, but must assess them coolly and objectively as knowledge 
claims. Here James’s words are equally familiar (367):
Mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the deliverance of 
their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private 
call thereto. The utmost they can ever ask of us in this life is to admit that 
they establish a presumption. . . . . But even this presumption . . . is far from 
being strong.3
Thus, the familiar confines of what I understand as James’s alterna-
tive to the twin perils identified just above. On one hand, this alternative 
would seem to offer something more than a naturalistic program in which 
any talk of religious experience must be cashed out in terms of secular life 
and its distinctive values.4 The mystic’s experience has beneficial conse-
quences, but this is in great part because (she thinks that) she has “been 
there and knows.”5 On the other hand, James’s approach will evidently 
settle for “less than perceptualism”—i.e., less than any unqualified claim 
that the mystic “perceives God.”6 This is not to say that, for James, it is flat-
out “wrong” to make such a claim, but only this: Insofar as the mystic’s 
perceptual claims fall on an audience unable to share those claims, the 
analogy with shareable perceptual knowledge of the natural world is not 
a very perspicuous one. We need something better.
However, development of such a Jamesian “middle course” will not be 
easy or straightforward (however congenial one might find its initial sug-
gestion to be).7 So, for instance, it hardly seems promising to begin by 
3Ibid., 367.
4A classic source for the naturalistic, as well as the pragmatic, approach to religious 
experience is John Dewey’s A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934). 
5Despite the pragmatic tone of much of Varieties, one of its unifying themes is the question 
of the ultimate “truth” of claims made on the basis of religious experiences—where this is not 
the same question as the secular utility of these. In Varieties, the pragmatist James can drive 
other pragmatists to the point of distraction. Thus Richard Rorty, “Some Inconsistencies in 
James’s Varieties,” in William James and the Science of Religion: Re-experiencing Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience, ed. Wayne Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 91: “The 
pragmatic reduction of experiences to their effect on practice is prominent in the first chap-
ter of Varieties, but by the last chapter it has been displaced. . . . Had he stuck to this line of 
thought, he would have thought that it hardly matters whether the sense of a wider self from 
which saving experiences come is caused by a chance surplus of serotonin or . . . by an im-
material entity that is itself the remote efficient cause of a rearrangement of neural impulses.”
6Views in this tradition include Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1979); William Wainwright, Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cogni-
tive Value, and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); William 
Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); and Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993).
7William Rowe, for one, after characterizing James’s position as a “middle path” says, 
by way of a kind of endorsement of this position, that “it is unlikely that studies of mysti-
cism over the intervening years have invalidated these conclusions”; see his Philosophy of 
Religion: An Introduction, third edition (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 2001), 71.
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saying that the mystic “knows” many things that others do not, but in 
a special sense of this term, according to which we are entirely free to 
believe or not believe these things. For this seems but to take away with 
one hand what the other has given. Yet a weaker attribution, according 
to which the mystic “may” possess knowledge, but is in no position to 
demonstrate this possession to others—this leaves difficulties and chal-
lenges of its own. Must this state of affairs be permanent; and, if so, why? 
How can this seemingly rather static, even frustrating, state of affairs be 
made epistemologically interesting? Does it admit of interesting forms of 
development, within these prescribed limits?
II. Agent-Relative Permissions
In any case, we begin by noticing the relevant modalities of James’s asym-
metry: the mystic is “permitted” to seek truth in her own way; but we are 
“not obligated” to regard her findings as possessing objective truth. In 
this regard, James’s middle path may be likened to what in moral theory 
are called “agent relative permissions,” for these too are permissions to 
undertake a certain activity, which others are not duty-bound to do any-
thing more than allow to take place. Thomas Nagel has distinguished 
such permissions in a particularly vivid way:
If I have a bad headache anyone has a reason to want it to stop. But if I badly 
want to become a first-rate concert pianist, not everyone has a reason to 
want me to practice. I have a reason for wanting to practice, and it may be 
just as strong as my reason for wanting the headache to go away. But other 
people have very little reason, if any, to care whether I become a first-rate 
pianist or not.8
The question arises, then, whether it may not be helpful to understand the 
liberty James accords the mystic as a kind of “agent-relative permission,” 
but to pursue epistemic rather than moral values.
First, let us recognize that agent-relative permissions (moral or epis-
temic) will properly be constrained by agent-neutral values and by well-
established means by which they may be produced. If “social equality” 
is thought to have agent-neutral value, well-established means of its at-
tainment will constrain (in some measure) my choice of personal projects. 
The point, however, is that this subjection is only partial; it falls well short 
of a constraint on all choice. Others may evaluate my personal projects 
as useful or foolish, but I am (at most) only partly constrained by their 
8“The Limits of Objectivity,” Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1980), 120–121. More fully stated, the relevant distinction here in-
volves, on one side, actions justified by their production of agent-neutral values; and, on 
the other, both agent-relative permissions and—what are not relevant to the current discus-
sion—“agent-relative constraints,” i.e., cases in which one is forbidden from maximizing 
agent-neutral value. Other seminal discussions of these issues include Bernard Williams, 
“A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973) and Derek Parfit, “Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” 
Proceedings of the British Academy 65 (1979), 539–564.
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evaluations. It may be wrong to devote all of one’s energies to something 
that, so far as concerns its agent-neutral value, is marginal at best. But 
it is not wrong to devote oneself occasionally to such matters; and there 
is no requirement that even one’s most serious projects maximize agent- 
neutral value.
Next, by way of linking these notions to the epistemic domain, let us 
allow that here the relevant agent-neutral value is truth. Again, this value 
is not dependent on particular choices or pursuits of particular epistemic 
subjects. Insofar as my pursuit of a particular project is justified by its 
promise of yielding truth, others have a reason, however compromised it 
may be by a host of other considerations, to be supportive.
If, then, suitably constrained agent-relative permissions are accept-
able from a moral standpoint, the same, it may be suggested, ought to be 
allowed for such permissions within the epistemic domain. But immedi-
ately there is a problem: insofar as truth is a kind of “constitutive value” 
for the entire epistemic domain, these cannot be intelligibly conceived as 
permissions to pursue other values. What, then, will be left? What will be 
the analogue of such agent-relative value as resides in Nagel’s becoming 
a concert pianist?
One initial answer is that truth admits of a plurality of kinds, including 
“religious truth” (itself admitting of many sub-kinds). To this, however, 
it will rightly be objected that sub-kinds of what has objective value (like 
the elimination of different forms of suffering) continue to have objec-
tive value. Still, a defender of the mystic and her prerogatives may reply 
in these terms: I will say that religious truth does have objective value. 
It is just that it is sufficiently hard to come by that any method for its at-
tainment that is not antecedently established as a way of pursuing other 
truths is at most “permitted”—like some novel and highly speculative 
way of eliminating suffering.
That does help, but not for very long; for we are brought up short by 
what will prove a characteristic difficulty for James. Yes, the method is 
speculative; but why is that an argument for anything more than a plea 
that others adopt a “wait and see” attitude? Perhaps in time this novel 
method will prove itself a success or a failure—in which case perceptual-
ism or naturalism is the winner, and James’s asymmetrical position falls 
over on one side or the other. Perhaps the jury will remain deadlocked 
forever; but that result, in itself, is hardly very encouraging or enlighten-
ing. Nor does the notion of agent-relativity have any more of interest to 
add at this point.
III. Complementary Epistemic Virtues
Still, to be fair, we should allow that the appeal to agent-relative permis-
sions has accomplished something. At the very least, it provides a parallel 
for James’s middle course, a broader, intellectually respectable classifica-
tion under which it can be placed. More boldly put, it puts the mystic 
in fairly good, and certainly not unreasonable, company (with would-be 
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concert pianists and the like). At worst, it has drawn our middle path up 
rather short.
Seeking guidance for a longer journey, we turn to an even more perva-
sive feature of the contemporary philosophical scene, and that is the idea 
of inquiry as guided by “epistemic virtues”—i.e., qualities of intellectual 
character thought to be conducive to the discovery of truth (and perhaps 
other intellectually worthwhile goals).9 The application of such a scheme 
to James’s asymmetrical approach to religious experience could proceed, 
I suggest, along these lines:
Enthusiasm for the discovery of new truth is an intellectually desirable 
quality, but, as with the moral virtues, there is a need for balance. There is a 
time and a place for strict justice and likewise for mercy; and, closer to our 
concerns here, there is a time for moral enthusiasm, and a time for caution, 
lest one go overboard. In the case of religious experience, such balance is 
best achieved by recognizing that contrary qualities will fall disproportion-
ately on different populations. To those gifted with religious experience, an 
excess of caution is particularly to be avoided, for caution can only have a 
dampening effect on such experiences—especially if applied when one is 
going on. The danger in the case of those not so gifted, however, is that they 
would too readily go along with excesses engendered by “true believers.” 
These others, too, have a role to play and that role is to be bulwarks of cau-
tion—not only at the level of action but belief as well.
The idea, then, is of an intellectual division of labor, matching James’s 
asymmetry, but at the level of predominant qualities of intellectual char-
acter. As one might instructively put this: the mystic should err on the 
side of enthusiasm; and others, caution.
One signal advantage of this proposal is easily explained. It allows us 
to hold that the mystic and the non-mystic are, or may certainly qualify 
as being, “equally virtuous” in their pursuit of truth and knowledge—
though without attributing knowledge to either side (mystical knowledge 
or knowledge, say, that the mystic is misguided). The possession or exhi-
bition of such virtues as intellectual enthusiasm and caution, that is to say, 
is no guarantee of truth or knowledge.10
This kind of “virtuous division of intellectual labor,” notice as well, is 
of help in beating back the following dilemma posed against James’s posi-
tion by Phillip Kitcher:
Suppose one could garner evidence for claiming that mystical states are 
veridical. Then, of course, there’d be no difficulty in understanding how 
9See, for instance, Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1991) and Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).
10Whether the “epistemic virtues” can be used to explicate knowledge is of course a 
point of some controversy—e.g., between such leading contemporary epistemologists as 
John Greco and Linda Zagzebski. See their lively exchange on this: Greco’s “Two Kinds of 
Intellectual Virtues” and her “Response to Greco,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
60 (2000), 170–184 and 207–210.
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the subjects of such states have the right to take them to be authoritative, 
but, by the same token, others, less fortunate in their more limited experi-
ences ought to defer to those with broader capacities. . . . On the other hand, 
if there is genuine doubt about the veridicality of mystical states, it would 
seem that the clear-headed mystic, aware of the situation, ought to suspend 
judgment.11
Part of the difficulty here is simply that the evidence “garnered” by 
the mystic is rather equivocal: having experienced these things, she can-
not discount them merely because others have not experienced them; nor 
can we who have not had such experiences credit these as evidence (on 
the strength merely of her claims to have done so). More to the present 
point, it will inhibit her very capacity to receive future “evidence” if she 
takes the kind of guarded attitude that we should take. As noted, different 
characteristic virtues apply—with no apparent likelihood of the kind of 
convergence that Kitcher sees as rightly taking place.
So far, then, relatively smooth sailing, I say. We have been able to at-
tribute positive intellectual attributes to each side, without the kind of 
knowledge that the “middle path” rejects. But if we press harder on this 
idea of an “epistemic virtue,” familiar difficulties begin to filter back in. 
In the abstract, it may be said that “enthusiasm” and “caution” (regarding 
truth) are epistemic virtues; but that is like saying that, in the abstract, 
kindness is a moral virtue. Whether one’s actual kindness is praiseworthy 
must surely depend on the person to whom it is directed and various facts 
concerning one’s situation—and likewise for intellectual enthusiasm. The 
mystic’s enthusiasm, a critic may point out, is only a virtue if it is directed 
at some reasonably promising hypothesis. If a hypothesis shows no par-
ticular promise of yielding truth, it should, at least after a while, be reject-
ed—or certainly be pursued with reduced enthusiasm. However, that is 
just the problem for James’s mystic (as long as she is conceived according 
to the “middle path” scheme). Insofar as her hypotheses command some 
credence, her enthusiasm is vindicated; but, by the same token, so will be 
a perceptualist account of her experiences. Insofar as they do not command 
this, naturalism will be the beneficiary. And likewise for our caution: inso-
far as the mystic’s hypotheses are gaining credibility, the value of caution 
is lessening. Insofar as the opposite is occurring, the opposite will be true. 
Either way, though, what had seemed a nice division of intellectual labor 
(and virtue) is threatened: in the end, it seems that either openness or cau-
tion must achieve a dominant position for all (and something like Kitcher’s 
dilemma will be proven right in the end).
Even so, it must be allowed that the appeal to different characteristic 
virtues does constitute an advance, relative to the appeal to “agent-rela-
tive permissions.” The latter, we observed, succeeded mainly in locating 
James’s mystic within a suitable, already recognized category; it did not, 
11Philip Kitcher, “A Pragmatist’s Progress: The Variety of James’s Strategies for Defend-
ing Religion,” in William James and the Science of Religion, 101.
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however, advance our understanding or appreciation of the respective 
positions of the mystic and those not sharing her experiences. The appeal 
to the epistemic virtues, it must be conceded, at least partly addresses this 
shortfall. For we are able to associate suitably diverse intellectual virtues 
with the asymmetrical positions of the mystic and the non-mystic, and to 
that extent accord positive epistemic credentials to each party.
IV. Love’s Knowledge
Can we do better, however? In effect, our division of intellectual labor 
has left us with two attitudes in the face of the unknown: openness and 
caution. Each is suitable, relative to the different experiences of the two 
parties. What we still need, however, is a more definite model, which is 
encouraging with respect to the mystic and her aspirations to knowledge, 
and at the same time possessed of enough built-in limitations—so far 
as the transmissibility of any knowledge-claims to others—to mark this 
quite indelibly as a Jamesian and not a perceptualist model.
In search of such a model, let us begin by recognizing that the asym-
metry James posits is by no means unique to religious experience. Taken 
in its most general sense, it is reflective of the different epistemic positions 
of those having and those not able to have any given type of experience. 
In particular, I want to suggest (in part, following James), that this asym-
metry is characteristic of such experiences as romantic love, and the first-
person cognitive claims to which it is liable to give rise.
Thus, consider the lover’s claim to “know” that his beloved has some 
special qualities, in virtue of which he terms her, say, “magical.” Asked 
why others do not generally perceive these same qualities, the short ver-
sion of his answer will be that because they do not love her, they lack his 
special sensitivity to these traits. But this claimed perception, or cognitive 
sensitivity of his, let us also notice, admits of two quite different under-
standings. It may actually be a special cognition he has of these qualities 
of hers; or it may be, in whole or part, a mere subjective reaction, which, if 
it discloses anything at all, shows something about him.12
Let us notice that elsewhere13 James is concerned with much this same 
contrast:
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms and perfections to the 
enchantment of which we onlookers are stone-cold. And which has the su-
perior view of the absolute truth, he or we? Which has the more insight into 
the nature of Jill’s existence, as a fact? Is he in excess, being in the manner of 
12In which case his attribution of these qualities to her is rather like an instance of what 
Stendhal, in his treatise On Love (trans. P. S. and C. N. Woolf [Mount Vernon, NY: Peter 
Pauper Press, 1950], 13), calls “crystallization.” This he defines as an “operation of the mind 
which, from everything which is presented to it draws the conclusion that there are new 
perfections in the object of love.”
13William James, Talks to Teachers of Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals (New 
York: Holt, 1899).
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a maniac? Or are we in defect, being victims of a pathological anesthesia as 
regards Jill’s magical importance?
Not surprisingly, we find James answering his own question on the 
side of the lover:
Surely the latter; surely to Jack are the profounder truths revealed; surely 
poor Jill’s palpitating little life-throbs are among the wonders of creation, 
are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame that the rest 
of us cannot feel like Jack. For Jack realizes Jill concretely, and we do not. 
He struggles toward a union with her inner life, divining her feelings, an-
ticipating her desires, understanding her limits as manfully as he can, and 
yet inadequately, too; for he also is inflicted with some blindness, even here. 
Whilst we, dead clods that we are, do not even seek after these things, but 
are contented that that portion of eternal fact named Jill should be for us as 
if it were not.
Here we may agree with James that Jack’s experience in relation to Jill 
is certainly much richer, purely as an experience, than ours. We may also 
agree that such intimacy is a good, even a great, thing. It is also unclear, 
however, whether what Jack can claim is knowledge of otherwise inacces-
sible qualities of Jill. Again, how is Jack able to tell whether, or the extent 
to which, what he experiences is a quality of hers, merely some very spe-
cial reaction he has to her, or something of each?14
Even so, our analogy is not without its good issue. For even if we are 
not entirely able to disentangle what is subjective and objective in the 
lover’s experience, it is surely plausible to suppose—we must, I think, con-
cede James this much—that the intense involvement of the lover in his 
beloved yields some special cognitive access, however mixed with noise 
this signal might be. It is surely plausible that, at times, the lover would 
have some level of experiential access to qualities of the beloved, access to 
which “we dead clods” are denied.
This is good. It is exactly the kind of model we seek: some promise of 
“special access”—and of development in this regard—yet with the kind of 
built-in limitations able effectively to block any immediate, contemplat-
ed claim of demonstrable knowledge, perceptual or other. That is to say: 
one can expect, with emotional development and growing closeness in a 
romantic relationship, the plausibility of claims to special knowledge to 
grow stronger; at the same time, none of this need, or can, carry over to 
anything evident to others.
With these points in mind, we return to the case of the mystic, who 
may be understood, surely, as a lover, but of different things. Here many 
questions and concerns must be passed over. How exactly is mystical 
different from romantic love? How is the mystic’s “love” related to other 
14Richard Gale, to whom I owe this fine passage, presses the Jamesian point that it takes 
a certain “sympathetic intuition” to enter into someone’s inner life in this way. “You can 
only really know someone,” he points out, “if you love them”; see The Divided Self of William 
James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248. Gale, however, does not raise, as 
we do here, the question of whether such intuition yields reliable knowledge.
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characteristically mystical forms of involvement and even absorption in 
the Godhead? Is the mystic’s knowledge supposed to follow upon her 
love—or is it more the reverse? Important as answers to these might be, it 
seems unlikely that they would emerge from a tradition in which concep-
tual boundaries are not, and are not meant to be, sharp.
What mainly matters is this. If, in the purely human domain, love bids 
fair to overcome the cognitive barrier separating one person from anoth-
er, it may also be said that the (somewhat) different love and different 
sensitivity of the mystic allows her to surmount, in some fashion, a differ-
ent epistemic barrier separating the human and what James likes to call 
“the divine.” Now this must be understood as a very modest claim. We 
will—in fact, must (as voyagers on this middle path)—continue to deny 
that either the earthly or the mystical lover is able to show us, who do not 
experience what she experiences, that these constitute knowledge of their 
object. Rather, we will submit only that in both cases (again we use what 
seems the best word) it is “plausible” to suppose that the unique sensi-
tivities, motivations, and emotional involvement each possesses give her 
some epistemic advantage, some greater possibility of knowledge, relative 
to others. At the same time, we freely admit that in both cases there is no 
small likelihood of bias, of all sorts of “noise” on whatever channels the 
lover and the mystic utilize.
At this point, however, some may want to object that these cases are not 
alike. It may be said: “we know that in the case of human love, the object 
of this love can be interpersonally experienced and obviously known to 
exist; the case of the mystic’s experience is entirely different.” But there 
are two countervailing points also to be noted. The first is nothing more 
than a reminder: the claims in question are in both cases precisely those 
to which such interpersonal access is denied. In ordinary terms, the object 
of the lover’s affection may be known to all, but not the special knowl-
edge he claims to have. The second response attempts to turn the tables: it 
will point out that if the case of the lover seems more secure in its earth-
bound characteristics, the case of the mystic is more secure in another. 
Many claim to have experienced this single divine object. In the case of 
romantic love, barring such dubious cases as Helen of Troy or Marilyn of 
Hollywood, its object is sought by only one or some very small number. 
To that extent, the claims of mystics can be compared and sorted through, 
while nothing like that is possible in the case of romantic love. At most, 
the lover can compare their experiences of, and cognitive claims respect-
ing, different objects.
Still, one may wish to pursue something of the above objection. Is there 
not at least this difference? Lovers are at least able to assure us that they 
share a common experience “of love.” As with those who have shared any 
other intense experience (such as riding a roller coaster), they are able to 
say: “You know what I mean; you’ve been there” (even if, hopefully, not 
with her). Mystics may speak of a common experience “of God” but we 
must take their word for it on that score.
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This, however, is an unfair comparison. In effect, it compares the famil-
iarity of the lover’s experience (qualitatively considered) to the unfamiliar-
ity of the object of the mystic’s experience. In other words, a fair compari-
son should either invoke the qualitative characteristics of the lover’s and 
the mystic’s experience, or it should compare such definite cognitions of 
an object each case may offer. The mistake, then, is to regard the lover’s 
cognitive achievements as somehow more definite and secure, based on 
the accessibility of his experiences as experiences. Thus, if we ask the lover 
what exactly he has come to know of the beloved, he will be very hard 
pressed to describe this. If, more pointedly, we challenge the lover to spec-
ify some one proposition, knowledge of which his love has gained him, and 
to which others’ access is blocked, he will be even more severely pressed 
to accomplish this. It seems that he will be forced to adopt either (or both) 
of the following, patently unsatisfactory responses:
He may supply a proposition, such as that “She is truly good” accom-
panied by an insistence that while others may also know that she is good, 
they are barred from “truly experiencing her goodness.” The first problem 
with this, of course, is that it has failed to meet the challenge of providing 
a relevant proposition only known to him; the second is that mystics are 
able to make precisely this claim with respect to such propositions as that 
God is One.
Alternatively, he may admit that there is no such proposition, but still 
insist that he knows her (qua distinctive object of knowledge) even if with-
out any accompanying propositional knowledge. Of course, this raises the 
fine, or not so fine, old distinction between knowledge by “acquaintance” 
and by “description.”15 For our part, however, we are content to make use 
of the same two points: that this is not responsive to the original chal-
lenge, which was to supply a relevant item of propositional knowledge; 
and, second, that the mystic, too, can make this kind of distinction. Of 
course, she, too, can say that her experience and knowledge of God is not 
“propositional,” that it is of God qua “object.”16
In short, the case for romantic love as a “model” for mysticism and 
its knowledge claims may be summed up in these terms. In both cases, 
there is an intense experience of emotional involvement in, and oneness 
with, what would otherwise be a distinct and in many ways unknowable 
being. In both cases, this absorption in the other carries to the point that 
the one becomes dead to other things (and alive only to this one). In both 
cases, there is the apparent transcendence of ordinary metaphysical and 
15On this see the classic discussion of Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1959), chapter five. It is notable that, for Russell and for em-
piricism generally, acquaintance provides a basis for description, not an alternative to it. 
16This is likely, on the mystic’s side (but also on the lover’s), to be bound up with a claim 
of what James calls “ineffability.” (How else could one claim both to have experienced an 
object which is distinctive in some way, but be unable to supply any kind of qualitative 
description of that object?) Even if this claim of ineffability is suspect, we must remind 
ourselves that the issue here is merely one of whether the mystic’s and the lover’s cognitive 
claims are fundamentally different, and not whether either constitutes knowledge.
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epistemic boundaries (separateness of persons and such limits as this im-
poses on knowledge). And, alas, in both cases, the apparent fruits of this 
special relation are ascertained only by those enjoying it. Others are left 
out, metaphysically and epistemically.
To the foregoing presentation of “love’s knowledge” as a model for 
mystical comprehension of the divine, let us now append a brief case for 
the distinct inferiority of ordinary perception as a model for the mystical. 
On this score, we note the following:17
First, perceptual reports are normally taken as telling us less about the 
perceiver than the perceived. The claim to see “a red Ford” is ordinarily 
more of automotive than biographical interest. In the case of love and 
mysticism, as we have emphasized, this is somewhat unclear. We take 
reports of their experiences, at least in the first instance, as enriching our 
knowledge of the subjects rather than the objects of their experiences. 
Romeo’s extravagant proclamations, in general, tell us more about him 
than her.
Second, such reliability tests as may be invoked in the case of love or 
mysticism amount to certain very broad plausibility considerations: if 
the lover or the mystic claims to experience something which contradicts 
what is known, or assumed to be true, concerning the objects of their 
claimed knowledge, we are rightly skeptical. By contrast, well established 
perceptual reports have the power to overturn what had been thought 
knowledge, which power the mystic’s and the lover’s experience are not 
granted. (It is interesting in this regard that mystics do not generally take 
their experiences to refute the experience-based claims of other mystics—
even when there are apparent conflicts, e.g., concerning the unity or tri-
une nature of God.)
Third, what happens in the case of the absence of any such contradic-
tion between an experiential report and what is independently known, 
or believed on good grounds, to be true is also illuminating. In this case, 
perceptual reports are generally taken as true; the lover’s and the mystic’s 
experiences are not.
Finally, it is noteworthy that James’s well-known four marks of mysti-
cal experience (329–330)—its “noetic,” passive, transitory, and “ineffable” 
(see note 16) characteristics—would very arguably apply as well to the 
experience of the lover more than to ordinary sense perception. The lat-
ter may be passive and transitory as individual episodes, but not with 
respect to the larger experiences in which perceptions are embedded (say, 
perceptual investigations). The more interesting point, however, concerns 
ineffability. In the case of sense perception, while it is true that all sen-
sory experience eludes direct verbal description, obviously we are able to 
make verbal reports, linking such experiences to what are assumed to be 
17For additional supporting discussion, critical of the “perceptualist” school cited in 
note 6, see especially Richard Gale, “The Cognitivity of Religious Experience,” Faith and 
Philosophy 22 (2005), 426–441. 
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matter of common perception (thus: “sky blue” and so forth). Of course, 
the mystic and the lover can, and typically will liken their descriptions 
to matters of common perception; however, as with the previously cited 
cases of “She is good” or “God is One,” they will resist too close an asso-
ciation, insisting that “you must experience this for yourself.”
V. Conclusion: On the Prospects of Development
Our initial challenge was to “develop” James’s middle path. Have we done 
so? I think we have at least begun this fairly daunting task. We have lo-
cated James’s project in the context of contemporary value theory, and 
contemporary epistemology. But more importantly, since these “leading 
ideas” only lead us so far, we have linked mysticism to what does admit 
of considerable development, I think, which is its association with human 
love and “love’s knowledge.” As befits James’s asymmetrical, bifurcated 
approach, however, this envisioned development must continue on two 
different fronts.
On the side of those having experiences of the right kind (i.e., on the 
side of the mystic), development is not a great issue or problem. For the 
model of “romantic love” has everything to do with development: both 
with the deepening of emotional ties and thereby deepening (apparent) 
cognition of the other, and the reverse: deepening cognition so as to en-
rich emotion.
On the side of us “dead clods” who lack these experiences, all three of 
the leading ideas we have considered—agent-relative permissions, epis-
temic virtue, and love’s knowledge—are much less promising (of develop-
ment). Our role is, respectively, one of “permitting without participating” 
(the case of Nagel’s would-be concert pianist); cautiously guarding against 
excesses; and the lover’s best friend and confidant, who hears much but is 
unsure exactly what to make of it. Whatever “development” goes on, it is 
strictly dependent on, and a reaction to, developments on the side of the 
lover or mystic!
So the “middle path,” as we must have known, is not a very equal path 
for all parties; but this is what all three of our models imply. They en-
tail a division of cognitive labor, of epistemic virtue, of experience, and 
of emotion. Like the aforementioned Jack (who knows Jill “concretely”), 
the mystic has this developing relationship, whose emotional aspects can 
hardly be gainsaid. If this model denies her a full attribution of “knowl-
edge” (and development in respect of that), there is at least the hope that 
emotional development may mean increase on the side of cognition. We 
who are in the position of Jack’s friends are both barred from this emo-
tional development and insofar as Jack’s deepest claims to know Jill are 
shot through with “ineffability,” are hardly able to share in these. As good 
friends, we can only remain steadfast and ever cautious, making sure that 
Jack’s enthusiasm does not get the better of him (taking advantage of the 
fact that it is very unlikely to get the better of us). But this is a matter more 
of constancy than development.
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What of “development” for the competing programs of perceptualism 
and naturalism? For perceptualism, development becomes of relatively 
less consequence inasmuch as, from this standpoint, the mystic is already 
there: she already knows. Of course, her experiences admit of progressive 
development, of “enrichment.” But the essence of perceptualism, unlike 
the middle path suggested by romantic love, lies in the cognitive achieve-
ment perception implies. For Deweyan naturalism, there will be develop-
ment on the side of the moral benefits of mystical experience (as these may 
be enjoyed by the mystic and others). But what of development on the side 
of those formative experiences which must partly explain those benefits? 
The difficulty, or certainly the challenge, for the naturalist is to explain 
this development in non-cognitive terms.
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